Overview
The line printer daemon enables various clients to share printers over a network. There exists a buffer overflow vulnerability in this daemon that permits remote execution of arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.
Description
There is a buffer overflow in several implementations of in.lpd, a BSD line printer daemon. An intruder can send a specially crafted print job to the target and then request a display of the print queue to trigger the buffer overflow. The intruder may be able use this overflow to execute arbitrary commands on the system with superuser privileges. The line printer daemon must be enabled and configured properly in order for an intruder to exploit this vulnerability. This is, however, trivial as the line printer daemon is commonly enabled to provide printing functionality. In order to exploit the buffer overflow, the intruder must launch his attack from a system that is listed in the "/etc/hosts.equiv" or "/etc/hosts.lpd" file of the target system. |
Impact
An intruder can remotely execute arbitrary commands on the system with the privileges of the line printer daemon, usually root or a superuser. |
Solution
Apply a patch, if available, from your vendor. |
Disable the line printer daemon if there is not a patch available from your vendor. |
Vendor Information
BSDI Affected
Updated: September 06, 2001
Status
Affected
Vendor Statement
The current (BSD/OS 4.2) release is not vulnerable. Systems are only vulnerable to attack from hosts which are allowed via the /etc/hosts.lpd file (which is empty as shipped).
BSD/OS 4.1 is the only vulnerable version which is still officially supported by Wind River Systems. A patch (M410-044) is available in the normal locations, ftp://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches or via our web site at http://www.bsdi.com/support
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
FreeBSD Affected
Updated: September 06, 2001
Status
Affected
Vendor Statement
ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-01:58.lpd.asc
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
NETBSD Affected
Updated: November 30, 2001
Status
Affected
Vendor Statement
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
NetBSD Security Advisory 2001-018
=================================
Topic:Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability in BSD Line Printer Daemon
Version:NetBSD-current: prior to August 28, 2001
NetBSD-1.5.2:affected
NetBSD-1.5.1:affected
NetBSD-1.5:affected
NetBSD-1.4.*:affected
Severity:Remote root compromise from any host which can connect to lpd(8)
Fixed:NetBSD-current:August 28, 2001
NetBSD-1.5 branch:September 30, 2001
NetBSD-1.4 branch: not yet
Abstract
========
There is an remotely exploitable buffer overrun in the printer daemon,
/usr/sbin/lpd.
Technical Details
=================
http://msgs.securepoint.com/cgi-bin/get/bugtraq0108/259.html
Solutions and Workarounds
=========================
NetBSD 1.3 and later install with lpd disabled by default. A system is
vulnerable to this security hole only if it is running /usr/sbin/lpd,
and access to lpd is allowed by entries in /etc/hosts.lpd. Updating
the binary for safety is recommended.
Quick workaround:
If you are running /usr/sbin/lpd, and you do not need it, stop it.
If you have /etc/hosts.lpd which is open to everyone, you will want to
tighten the setup so that no malicious parties can access your remote printer.
Solutions:
* NetBSD -current, 1.5, 1.5.1, 1.5.2:
Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2001-08-28
should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2001-08-28 or later.
Systems running NetBSD 1.5, 1.5.1 or 1.5.2 dated from before
2001-09-30 should be upgraded to NetBSD-1.5 branch sources dated
2001-09-30 or later.
The following directory needs to be updated from the
netbsd-current CVS branch (aka HEAD) for NetBSD-current,
or netbsd-1-5 CVS branch for NetBSD 1.5, 1.5.1 or 1.5.2:
src/usr.sbin/lpr
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install lpd(8):
# cd src/usr.sbin/lpr
# cvs update -d -P
# make cleandir dependall install
Alternatively, apply the following patch (with potential offset
differences) and rebuild & re-install lpd(8):
ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/patches/SA2001-018-lpd.patch
To patch, re-build and re-install lpd(8):
# cd src/usr.sbin/lpr/common_sources
# patch < /path/to/SA2001-012-lpd.patch
# make cleandir dependall install
* NetBSD 1.4, 1.4.x:
Systems running NetBSD-1.4.x releases should apply the following
patch (with potential offset differences):
ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/patches/SA2001-018-lpd.patch
To patch, re-build and re-install lpd(8):
# cd src/usr.sbin/lpr/common_sources
# patch < /path/to/SA2001-012-lpd.patch
# make cleandir dependall install
The anonymous CVS branch netbsd-1-4 should be updated with a
fix in the near future.
Thanks To
=========
Jun-ichiro Hagino for the original patches to -current, from a fix in
OpenBSD
Revision History
================
2001-11-22 Initial release
More Information
================
An up-to-date PGP signed copy of this release will be maintained at
ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2001-018.txt.asc
Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
http://www.NetBSD.ORG/ and http://www.NetBSD.ORG/Security/.
Copyright 2001, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
NetBSD Version 1.5.1 and earlier have been reported vulnerable in the Internet Security Systems Advisory.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
OpenBSD Affected
Updated: September 06, 2001
Status
Affected
Vendor Statement
We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
Red Hat Affected
Updated: November 08, 2001
Status
Affected
Vendor Statement
http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2001-147.html
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
SCO Affected
Updated: November 01, 2001
Status
Affected
Vendor Statement
___________________________________________________________________________
Caldera International, Inc. Security Advisory
Subject: OpenServer: remote buffer overflow vulnerability in BSD line printer daemon
Advisory number: CSSA-2001-SCO.20
Issue date: 2001 September 26
Cross reference:
___________________________________________________________________________
1. Problem Description
The BSD-derived lpd daemon is vulnerable to a buffer overflow.
This could be used by an unauthorized user to gain privilege.
2. Vulnerable Versions
Operating System Version Affected Files
------------------------------------------------------------------
OpenServer <= 5.0.6a /usr/lib/lpd
/usr/bin/lpstat
3. Workaround
None.
4. OpenServer
4.1 Location of Fixed Binaries
ftp://stage.caldera.com/pub/security/openserver/CSSA-2001-SCO.20/
4.2 Verification
md5 checksums:
48f989acb3a6606181575b3b765cd89e lpd.tar.Z
md5 is available for download from
ftp://stage.caldera.com/pub/security/tools/
4.3 Installing Fixed Binaries
Upgrade the affected binaries with the following commands:
Download the tar file to /tmp
# cd /tmp
# uncompress lpd.tar.Z
# tar xvf lpd.tar
# mv /usr/lib/lpd /usr/lib/lpd-
# mv /usr/bin/lpstat /usr/bin/lpstat-
# cp lpstat /usr/bin
# chown bin /usr/bin/lpstat
# chgrp lp /usr/bin/lpstat
# chmod 2111 /usr/bin/lpstat
# cp lpd /usr/lib
# chown root /usr/lib/lpd
# chgrp bin /usr/lib/lpd
# chmod 2711 /usr/lib/lpd
5. References
http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/advise94.php
This and other advisories are located at
http://stage.caldera.com/support/security
This advisory addresses Caldera Security internal incident
sr851853.
6. Disclaimer
Caldera International, Inc. is not responsible for the misuse
of any of the information we provide on our website and/or
through our security advisories. Our advisories are a service
to our customers intended to promote secure installation and
use of Caldera International products.
7. Acknowledgements
Caldera International wishes to thank the Internet Security
Systems (ISS) X-Force for discovering and reporting this
problem.
___________________________________________________________________________
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
SGI Affected
Updated: November 01, 2001
Status
Affected
Vendor Statement
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
______________________________________________________________________________
SGI Security Advisory
Title: IRIX Printing System Vulnerabilities
Number: 20011003-01-P
Reference: CERT® Advisory CA-2001-15
Reference: ISS Advisory 20010619
Reference: CVE CAN-2001-0353
Date: October 31, 2001
______________________________________________________________________________
SGI provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its
consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. SGI recommends
that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
SGI provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis
only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied
or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability
or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall SGI be liable for
any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect,
special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising
from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions
or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------
Issue #1: lpd
ISS X-Force has discovered a buffer overflow in BSD-based line
printer daemons (lpd) that may allow a remote or local attacker
to crash the daemon or execute arbitrary code with super user
privilege. Although lpd is part of the IRIX print.sw.bsdlpr
system and is not installed by default, if it is installed it
runs with root privileges by default on all current IRIX
versions.
Issue #2: lpsched
Last Stage of Delirium has reported vulnerabilities in the
lpsched program which allow remote attackers with sufficient
control of their remote network to obtain 'root' and 'lp'
privileges remotely. lpsched is installed by default on all
current IRIX versions.
Issue #3: lpstat
Last Stage of Delirium has reported a vulnerability in the
lpstat command in the way it loads and executes code from user
supplied net-type shared library objects. When appropriately
exploited it can lead to a local root compromise on a
vulnerable system. lpstat is installed by default on all
current IRIX versions.
- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------
lpsched and lpstat are installed by default on IRIX.
lpd is part of the optional print.sw.bsdlpr subsystem and is not
installed by default on IRIX.
A local user account on the vulnerable system is not required
in order to exploit these vulnerabilities. Vulnerable systems
can be exploited remotely over an untrusted network.
These vulnerabilities can lead to a root compromise.
ISS X-Force reported the lpd vulnerability:
http://xforce.iss.net/alerts/advise80.php
The lpd vulnerability was also reported by CERT® Advisory CA-2001-15:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-15.html
The lpd vulnerability was assigned the following CVE:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0353
Last Stage of Delirium reported the lpstat and lpsched vulnerabilities:
http://www.lsd-pl.net/files/get?IRIX/irx_lpstat2
http://www.lsd-pl.net/files/get?IRIX/irx_lpsched
http://www.lsd-pl.net/files/get?IRIX/irx_lpsched2
These vulnerabilities have been publicly discussed in Usenet
newsgroups and security mailing lists.
- ----------------------
- --- Recommendation ---
- ----------------------
SGI has investigated the issues and recommends the following
steps for neutralizing the exposures. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI
systems. This issue has been corrected in future releases of
IRIX.
- --------------------------
- --- Temporary Solution ---
- --------------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.
The steps below can be used to remove the print.sw subsystems
to prevent exploitation of these vulnerabilities until patches
can be installed.
=================
**** WARNING ****
=================
These steps will disable printing capabilities.
1) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
2) Stop the printing services
# /etc/init.d/bsdlpr stop
# /etc/init.d/lp stop
3) Use the "versions" command to remove the printing
subsystems:
# versions remove print.sw.*
5) Return to previous level.
# exit
%
6) It is not necessary to reboot the system.
- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 4.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 5.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.0.x unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.1 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.2 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.3 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.4 unknown Note 1
IRIX 6.5 yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.1 yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.2m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.2f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.3m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.3f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.4m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.4f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.5m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.5f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.6m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.6f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.7m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.7f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.8m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.8f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.9m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.9f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.10m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.10f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.11m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.11f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.12m yes 4381 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.12f yes 4382 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5.13m yes 4381 Note 3 & 4
IRIX 6.5.13f yes 4382 Note 3 & 5
IRIX 6.5.14m no
IRIX 6.5.14f no
NOTES
1) This version of the IRIX operating has been retired.
Upgrade to an actively supported IRIX operating system.
See http://support.sgi.com/irix/news/index.html#policy
for more information.
2) This version of the IRIX operating system is in maintenance mode.
Upgrade to an actively supported IRIX operating system.
See http://support.sgi.com/news/support/index.html for more
information.
3) See "Temporary Solution" section.
4) Download the IRIX 6.5.13 Maintenance Release Stream from the URL:
http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html
5) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.13 CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your
SGI Support Provider or URL: http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/
Patches are available via the web, anonymous FTP and from your SGI
service/support provider.
SGI Security Advisories can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/advisories/
SGI Security Patches can be found at:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ and
ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/patches/
SGI patches for IRIX can be found at the following patch servers:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/
SGI freeware updates for IRIX can be found at:
http://freeware.sgi.com/
SGI fixes for SGI open sourced code can be found on:
http://oss.sgi.com/projects/
SGI patches and RPMs for Linux can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/linux/ or
http://oss.sgi.com/projects/sgilinux-combined/download/security-fixes/
SGI patches for Windows NT or 2000 can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/nt/
IRIX 5.2-6.4 Recommended/Required Patch Sets can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/ and ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/patchset/
IRIX 6.5 Maintenance Release Streams can be found at:
http://support.sgi.com/colls/patches/tools/relstream/index.html
IRIX 6.5 Software Update CDs can be obtained from:
http://support.sgi.com/irix/swupdates/
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches
is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches
are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/
For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirrors
patches.sgi.com security FTP repository) lags behind and does not
do a real-time update.
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.4381
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10847 10 README.patch.4381
Algorithm #2 (sum): 42018 10 README.patch.4381
MD5 checksum: 7C29B82B034E4BDF9C30395ED4654C1F
Filename: patchSG0004381
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 14603 8 patchSG0004381
Algorithm #2 (sum): 42286 8 patchSG0004381
MD5 checksum: A285EC4339BACE5237041B9BAB30234F
Filename: patchSG0004381.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32530 10 patchSG0004381.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 5594 10 patchSG0004381.idb
MD5 checksum: BE0CBA67C72C20D4E654E6E4E8B6AAA9
Filename: patchSG0004381.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64956 1646 patchSG0004381.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22067 1646 patchSG0004381.print_sw
MD5 checksum: AF14FA2E67DECC6125B2003563671E1F
Filename: README.patch.4382
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40351 10 README.patch.4382
Algorithm #2 (sum): 41404 10 README.patch.4382
MD5 checksum: FAACCCD66DDF89F458D3B8E1711A07AE
Filename: patchSG0004382
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00905 7 patchSG0004382
Algorithm #2 (sum): 14079 7 patchSG0004382
MD5 checksum: A1CBC07679FD1B4997B44F07ED8D995F
Filename: patchSG0004382.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 27746 10 patchSG0004382.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 5562 10 patchSG0004382.idb
MD5 checksum: A7268E9BA48D5C1824F33212DFEAE1E5
Filename: patchSG0004382.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 58752 1650 patchSG0004382.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 65465 1650 patchSG0004382.print_sw
MD5 checksum: 2FF6D7220C752471C6AF722E3600AF8C
- ------------------------
- --- Acknowledgments ----
- ------------------------
SGI wishes to thank Last Stage of Delirium, ISS X-Force,
CERT Coordination Center and the users of the Internet
Community at large for their assistance in this matter.
- -----------------------------------------
- --- SGI Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
------oOo------
SGI provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI
community. This information is freely available to any person needing
the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security advisories and patches
is patches.sgi.com (216.32.174.211). Security advisories and patches
are located under the URL ftp://patches.sgi.com/support/free/security/
The SGI Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL:
http://www.sgi.com/support/security/
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
security-info@sgi.com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
SGI provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and
encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all
SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing
list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/support/security/wiretap.html)
or by sending email to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
SGI provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is
located at http://www.sgi.com/support/security/ .
------oOo------
If there are general security questions on SGI systems, email can be
sent to security-info@sgi.com.
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties
and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any
way, SGI is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
SuSE Affected
Updated: November 01, 2001
Status
Affected
Vendor Statement
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
______________________________________________________________________________
SuSE Security Announcement
Package: lprold
Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2001:033
Date: Wed Oct 10 11:03:12 GMT 2001
Affected SuSE versions: [6.1, 6.2,] 6.3, 6.4, 7.0, 7.1, 7.2
Vulnerability Type: bufferoverflow/local privilege escalation
Severity (1-10): 6
SuSE default package: yes
Other affected systems: Other Linux distributions, *BSD
Content of this advisory:
1) security vulnerability resolved: Several problems in lprold
problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information
2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds
3) standard appendix (further information)
______________________________________________________________________________
1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information
ISS X-Force reported an overflow in BSD's lineprinter daemon shipped with
the lprold package in SuSE Linux. Due to missing bounds checks in the
lockfile processing function, internal buffers may overflow. Bounds checks
have been added to fix that problem.
Additionally the SuSE Security Team uncovered other security releated bugs
in lpd while analyzing lpd source after receiving the X-Force advisory.
These bugs allows users on machines listed in /etc/hosts.lpd or
/etc/hosts.equiv to chown any file on the system running lpd to any user.
In order to trigger any of the fixed bugs (including the overflow) the
attackers machine must be listed in one of these two access-files and the
attacker usually needs root on these machines due to the privileged-port
requirement.
Please download the packages and verify them as described in section 3.
After successful authentication you can update your packages with
the command `rpm -Uhv file.rpm'.
As root invoke the command "/etc/rc.d/lpd stop" to shutdown the old lpd
daemon and "/etc/rc.d/lpd start" afterwards to start the patched daemon.
i386 Intel Platform:
SuSE-7.2
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/n1/lprold-3.0.48-272.i386.rpm
23b8251411a557563cb314102f405d31
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.2/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-272.src.rpm
ff590e05f2a7c85e9d234bd32d12b13a
SuSE-7.1
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/n1/lprold-3.0.48-275.i386.rpm
b6efc424262ec9aaa39ac84f230b3df2
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.1/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-275.src.rpm
5a95de121c7520bf33620dddbfdda611
SuSE-7.0
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/n1/lprold-3.0.48-275.i386.rpm
10792a921880048970f40470f1b94330
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/7.0/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-275.src.rpm
094b06515dfd865c6dffedf70de5e6cc
SuSE-6.4
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/6.4/n1/lprold-3.0.48-275.i386.rpm
da1b920d23694a807f91c74301b47ced
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/6.4/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-275.src.rpm
c2c45f04a2d44e374689346f488e8c52
SuSE-6.3
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/6.3/n1/lprold-3.0.48-275.i386.rpm
8f7c5538e878f197de1e6dacdb6a8479
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/update/6.3/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-275.src.rpm
d13f74f6449ee40b98b2ed0e42e9d2ec
Sparc Platform:
SuSE-7.1
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.1/n1/lprold-3.0.48-216.sparc.rpm
78a947db44bc4a41cb33eee1b931b99e
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.1/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-216.src.rpm
2c873632eaa6f01efb45cba3f1308cd3
SuSE-7.0
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.0/n1/lprold-3.0.48-216.sparc.rpm
45320846ee6143fdfc27a7d578f630bd
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/sparc/update/7.0/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-216.src.rpm
1be6f31b6924f81fb965b0dce053f6cb
AXP Alpha Platform:
SuSE-7.1
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/n1/lprold-3.0.48-215.alpha.rpm
94af7565e8920cdce6e1e7c51f562fba
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.1/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-215.src.rpm
0757d322145ef6c2179c8e31b1169cd2
SuSE-7.0
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/n1/lprold-3.0.48-215.alpha.rpm
3c6a2b2b21fcc1b94974aca6c5930e98
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/7.0/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-215.src.rpm
0222dec4d0287b9f1f267b86e8e8a4dd
SuSE-6.4
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/6.4/n1/lprold-3.0.48-215.alpha.rpm
f4c618b43a95bd94ed679c1c2119a7aa
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/6.4/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-215.src.rpm
0430ec91e7515d79326ed16f492ea60e
SuSE-6.3
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/6.3/n1/lprold-3.0.48-215.alpha.rpm
68a8b9a26e17ed5183b8385be349c6a9
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/axp/update/6.3/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-215.src.rpm
582d925d8328f79bc566dddcc62f763b
Power PC Platform:
SuSE-7.1
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.1/n1/lprold-3.0.48-200.ppc.rpm
3c16c1975b8f9dae3ccfb67dd5f462db
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.1/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-200.src.rpm
37b0d3534e39273e158eba42f75f8e31
SuSE-7.0
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/n1/lprold-3.0.48-200.ppc.rpm
d0e5a115d8991e711ef75fc8b06e1d97
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/7.0/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-200.src.rpm
e4d589e9225365b103b502a26d0fd73f
SuSE-6.4
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/6.4/n1/lprold-3.0.48-200.ppc.rpm
f8e7557f995388564f98e9bae4708e4e
source rpm:
ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/ppc/update/6.4/zq1/lprold-3.0.48-200.src.rpm
78a647beeaf5a5541cb15aa6435ba65e
______________________________________________________________________________
2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds:
- sftp/openssh:
Our last announcement SuSE-SA:2001:032 about WindowMaker claimed
that the openssh packages on SuSE distributions do not contain the
sftp-server as described by Peter W <peterw@usa.net> on the bugtraq
mailing list. This is wrong: The program is indeed included on all
recent openssh packages of SuSE Linux distributions, starting with
SuSE Linux 6.4 where the openssh package appeared first.
We will provide fixes for the distributions 6.4 through 7.2 as soon as
possible on our ftp server (ftp.suse.de for 6.4-7.0, ftp.suse.com for
7.1 and newer) and announce these fixes in the section 2) of an
upcoming security announcement.
Please note that this error has been corrected shortly before the
release of the upcoming SuSE Linux 7.3 which will arrive in the stores
by the end of this week.
We apologize for this error (Roman Drahtmueller, SuSE Security).
- squid
Malformed requests on the client side can cause the squid proxy server
to die, resulting in a denial of service attack that can be launched
from the internal network if squid is used at the edge of an internal
network to proxy requests to the internet.
We are in the process of testing the update packages that are
available on the ftp server shortly. SuSE Security will issue a
dedicated announcement for this issue shortly.
- devfs/kernel
SuSE Linux ships the userspace utilities for the use of the devfs
filesystem in the linux kernel, but neither the utilities nor the
filesystem interface for device files itself have been used in SuSE
Linux up to date. The decision to not actively use devfsd in the
distribution framework is based on security considerations.
For these reasons, SuSE products are not susceptible to the lately
found security problems in the devfs implementation.
______________________________________________________________________________
3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information
- Package authenticity verification:
SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over
the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important
to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be
sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing
the package. There are two verification methods that can be used
independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded
file or rpm package:
1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement.
2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.
1) execute the command
md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm>
after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors.
Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the
announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is
cryptographically signed (usually using the key security@suse.de),
the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package.
We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the
email message containing the announcement to be modified so that
the signature does not match after transport through the mailing
list software.
Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the
announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt
and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all
md5 sums for the files are useless.
2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity
of an rpm package. Use the command
rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm>
to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the
filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course,
package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm
package file.
Prerequisites:
a) gpg is installed
b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this
key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory
~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the
signature verification (usually root). You can import the key
that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving
this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and
running the command (do "su -" to be root):
gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import
SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the
key "build@suse.de" upon installation or upgrade, provided that
the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key
is placed at the toplevel directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg)
and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de .
- SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may
subscribe:
suse-security@suse.com
- general/linux/SuSE security discussion.
All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list.
To subscribe, send an email to
<suse-security-subscribe@suse.com>.
suse-security-announce@suse.com
- SuSE's announce-only mailing list.
Only SuSE's security annoucements are sent to this list.
To subscribe, send an email to
<suse-security-announce-subscribe@suse.com>.
For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq)
send mail to:
<suse-security-info@suse.com> or
<suse-security-faq@suse.com> respectively.
===================================================
SuSE's security contact is <security@suse.com>.
The <security@suse.com> public key is listed below.
===================================================
______________________________________________________________________________
The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced,
provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular,
it is desired that the cleartext signature shows proof of the
authenticity of the text.
SuSE GmbH makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect
to the information contained in this security advisory.
Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID
pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <security@suse.de>
pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <build@suse.de>
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
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=Jnnf
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3i
Charset: noconv
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
Caldera Not Affected
Notified: September 04, 2001 Updated: November 01, 2001
Status
Not Affected
Vendor Statement
We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
Engarde Not Affected
Updated: November 01, 2001
Status
Not Affected
Vendor Statement
We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
Fujitsu Not Affected
Updated: November 01, 2001
Status
Not Affected
Vendor Statement
We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
IBM Not Affected
Notified: September 04, 2001 Updated: November 01, 2001
Status
Not Affected
Vendor Statement
We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
Sun Not Affected
Updated: October 02, 2001
Status
Not Affected
Vendor Statement
We have not received a statement from the vendor.
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
Apple Unknown
Updated: November 09, 2001
Status
Unknown
Vendor Statement
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
Compaq Computer Corporation Unknown
Updated: November 05, 2001
Status
Unknown
Vendor Statement
Compaq has not been able to reproduce the problems identified in this advisory for TRU64 UNIX. We will continue testing and address the LPD issues if a problem is discovered and provide patches as necessary.
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
Cray Unknown
Updated: October 15, 2001
Status
Unknown
Vendor Statement
Cray, Inc. has been unable to prove an lpd vulnerability. However, it was deemed that a buffer overflow may be possible and so did tighten up the code. See Cray SPR 721101 for more details.
Vendor Information
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
Addendum
SPR's are available to Cray customers only.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us email.
CVSS Metrics
| Group | Score | Vector |
|---|---|---|
| Base | ||
| Temporal | ||
| Environmental |
References
Acknowledgements
This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Mark Dowd of Internet Security Systems (ISS). The CERT/CC wishes to thank ISS for the information contained in their advisory.
This document was written by Jason Rafail.
Other Information
| CVE IDs: | CVE-2001-0670 |
| Severity Metric: | 32.22 |
| Date Public: | 2001-08-28 |
| Date First Published: | 2001-09-10 |
| Date Last Updated: | 2001-11-30 14:25 UTC |
| Document Revision: | 12 |