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    <div data-type="accordion-section" class="vinfo affected info" name="Cisco Systems Inc.">
      
      <h3 class="accordion-header ui-accordion-header reloaded">
	<span class="vendor_name"><a href="#SVHN-5CV6CP">Cisco Systems Inc. </a>
	  <span class="vendor-icons">
	    
	    <i class="fas fa-bullhorn" aria-hidden="true" title="Vendor provided information"></i>
	    
	  </span>
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	<span class="vendor_status">
	  <span class="label alert">Affected</span> 
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	<p>
	  
            Updated:&nbsp;&nbsp;August 09, 2002
            
	  </span>
	</p>
	
	<h3>Status</h3>
	<p><span class="label alert">Affected</span> </p>
	<h3>Vendor Statement</h3>
	<p>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- UPDATED: Cisco Security Advisory: LDAP Connection Leak in CTI when
	 User Authentication Fails The Cisco Security Advisory regarding a memory leak in LDAP connections
when CTI user authentication fails has been updated with new information. Cisco is reissuing this advisory because the affected software versions
and first fixed releases information was listed incorrectly in previous
versions of the advisory. Cisco CallManager version 3.0 is affected
and the first fixed release is Cisco CallManager version 3.1(3a). Customers running 3.1(3a) or later are still unaffected. Cisco Security Advisory: LDAP Connection Leak in CTI when User Authentication
Fails Revision 1.2 For Public Release 2002 March 27 17:00 GMT Last Updated 2002 March 29 18:00 GMT Contents Summary
    Affected Products
    Details
    Impact
    Software Versions and Fixes
    Obtaining Fixed Software
    Workarounds
    Exploitation and Public Announcements
    Status of This Notice
    Distribution
    Revision History
    Cisco Security Procedures Summary The Cisco CallManager, running certain software releases, has a vulnerability
wherein a memory leak in the CTI Framework authentication can cause the server
to crash and result in a reload. This vulnerability can be exploited to
initiate a denial of service (DoS) attack. This vulnerability is documented as Cisco bug ID CSCdv28302. There are
workarounds available to mitigate the vulnerability. This advisory is available at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/callmanager-ctifw-leak-pub.shtml. Affected Products To determine if a product is vulnerable, review the list below. If the software
versions or configuration information are provided, then only those
combinations are vulnerable. * Cisco CallManager 3.0, 3.1 No other Cisco product is known to be affected by this vulnerability. Details A memory leak in the Cisco CallManager has been attributed to the failure of a
user to properly authenticate when using Computer Telephony Integration (CTI). This behavior is most commonly seen on CallManager systems immediately
following the integration with a customer directory such as Active Directory
(AD) or Netscape. The most common cause in this scenario is that the
WebAttendant user, CTI Framework (CTIFW), has not been configured with a valid
password in the customer directory. Please note that this problem will occur
even on systems that do not utilize the WebAttendant since the Telephony Call
Dispatch (TCD) service is always enabled by default. The CCMAdmin->Global
Directory and "Add a New User" configuration pages stop working if CTIFW user
is not configured or the CTI user's password is incorrect. Various other
components such as RIS Data Collector may also fail to function properly. Bug ID
    This vulnerability is documented as Cisco Bug ID CSCdv28302. Problem Symptoms There are several indicators available in determining if this problem is at the
root. LDAP Leak Detection | Tool  |                   Message                   | |       |Error: kCtiProviderOpenFailure - CTI         |
|       |application failed to open provider          |
|       |CTIconnectionId: 485                         |
|       |Login User Id: CtiFw                         |
|       |ReasonCode: 2362179680                       |
|       |IPAddress: 172.21.12.44                      |
|       |App ID: Cisco CTIManager                     |
|       |Cluster ID: JMTAO-CM2-Cluster                |
|Event  |Node ID: JMTAO-CM2                           |
|Viewer |CTI Application ID: Cisco Telephony Call     |
|       |Dispatcher                                   |
|       |Process ID: 0                                |
|       |Process Name: CtiHandler                     |
|       |Provider Name: CTI Framework                 |
|       |Explanation: Application is unable to open   |
|       |provider. |       |Recommended Action: Check the reason code and|
|       |correct the problem. Restart                 |
|       |CTIManager if problem persists.. |       |From the Task Manager select the Processes   |
|       |tab, click View and then Select Columns... |Task   |Check Handle Count and click OK. |Manager|Click on the Handles column to sort by       |
|       |handles used. |       |You will observe that the CTIManager.exe is  |
|       |consuming a large number of handles (> 500). |       |Another diagnostic tool is to run "netstat   |
|       |-na" from a DOS command prompt on the CM     |
|DOS    |server. A very large number of established   |
|netstat|connections to TCP port 389 if CallManager is|
|       |integrated with AD or port 8404 when         |
|       |CallManager is integrated with DCD. Impact The vulnerabilities can be exploited to produce a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack. When the vulnerabilities are exploited, they can cause an affected
Cisco product to crash and reload. Software Versions and Fixes |Version       |Fixed Regular Release (available now) |
|Affected      |Fix carries forward into all later    |
|              |versions                              | |Version 3.0   |Upgrade to 3.1(3a)                    | |Version 3.1   |Upgrade to 3.1(3a)                    | Obtaining Fixed Software Cisco is offering free software upgrades to address this vulnerability for all
affected customers. Customers may only install and expect support for the
feature sets they have purchased. Customers with service contracts should contact their regular update channels
to obtain any software release containing the feature sets they have purchased. For most customers with service contracts, this means that upgrades should be
obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at
http://www.cisco.com. Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through a prior or
existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco
Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that
support organization for assistance with obtaining the free software upgrade
(s). Customers who purchased directly from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third party vendors but are
unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale, should
obtain fixed software by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC)
using the contact information listed below. In these cases, customers are
entitled to obtain an upgrade to a later version of the same release or as
indicated by the applicable row in the Software Versions and Fixes table (noted
above). Cisco TAC contacts are as follows: * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  * e-mail: tac@cisco.com See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional
TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and
instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Please do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com"
for software upgrades. Workarounds Configure the ctifw user by following the instructions at: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/voice/c_callmg/3_0/install/ad_3011.htm#xtocid30717 |Step|                     Action                     | |    |Set the password for the user in the corporate  |
|1   |directory using your standard user management   |
|    |tools. |    |On a Cisco CallManager server, choose Start >   |
|2   |Run and enter command to open a command prompt. |    |Click OK. |3   |Enter the command, PasswordUtils; for example,  |
|    |"passwordUtils my_passphrase"                   | |    |The previous action generates an encrypted      |
|4   |password. Copy the password into the Windows    |
|    |clipboard. |5   |Choose Start > Run. |6   |Enter regedit into the Open field and then click|
|    |OK. |    |Browse to \\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Cisco   |
|7   |Systems, Inc.\Directory Configuration within the|
|    |registry. |8   |Delete the value CTIFWPW and paste the encrypted|
|    |password from Step 3 into the field. |    |Restart the Cisco Telephony Call Dispatcher     |
|    |service by choosing Start > Programs >          |
|9   |Administrative Tools > Services. Highlight the  |
|    |service in the list; right click on the service |
|    |and then click Restart from the drop-down list. |10  |Repeat Step 2 through Step 9 for each Cisco     |
|    |CallManager server in the cluster. IMPORTANT: Please note that you must reboot the CM server in all cases to reset
the established TCP connections and recover the lost memory. Alternatively, if you are not using the Cisco WebAttendant and/or the Cisco
Telephony Call Dispatcher Service, set it to "manual" or "disabled" from the
"Services" control panel. Exploitation and Public Announcements The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of
the vulnerabilities described in this advisory. Status of This Notice: Interim This is a Interim advisory. Although Cisco cannot guarantee the accuracy of all
statements in this notice, all of the facts have been checked to the best of
our ability. Cisco does not anticipate issuing updated versions of this
advisory unless there is some material change in the facts. Should here be a
significant change in the facts, Cisco may update this advisory. Distribution This notice will be posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/callmanager-ctifw-leak-pub.shtml. In addition to Worldwide Web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients: * cust-security-announce@cisco.com
  * bugtraq@securityfocus.com
  * first-teams@first.org (includes CERT/CC)
  * cisco@spot.colorado.edu
  * comp.dcom.sys.cisco
  * firewalls@lists.gnac.com
  * Various internal Cisco mailing lists Future updates of this notice, if any, will be placed on Cisco's Worldwide Web
server, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the URL
given above for any updates. Revision History |Revision    |2002-Mar-27 17: |Initial Public Release |
|Number 1.0  |00 GMT          |                       | |Revision    |2002-Mar-28 17: |Corrected first fixed  |
|Number 1.1  |00 GMT          |release. |Revision    |2002-Mar-29 18: |Updated affected       |
|Number 1.2  |00 GMT          |products and fixed     |
|            |                |releases. Cisco Security Procedures Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products,
obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive
security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's Worldwide Web site at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/sec_incident_response.shtml. This includes
instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco
Security Advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. This notice is Copyright 2002 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely after the release date given at the top of the text,
provided that redistributed copies are complete and unmodified, and include all
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	<h3>Vendor Information </h3>
	<p>The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.</p>
	
	
	
	<h3>Addendum</h3>
	<p>The CERT/CC has no additional comments at this time.</p>
	
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